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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 














On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2-16-cr-00582-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler 
____________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 9, 2019 
Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and BIBAS, Circuit Judges. 
 





                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Thomas V. Savino, M.D., appeals his judgment of conviction and sentence. We 
will affirm.  
I1 
 Savino operated a solo medical practice in Staten Island, New York. From August 
2012 to April 2013, he accepted monthly cash payments from Biodiagnostic Laboratory 
Services (BLS), a blood laboratory headquartered in Parsippany, New Jersey. Savino 
agreed with Cliff Antell, a BLS recruiter, to allow the lab to set up a station to draw blood 
in the rear suite of his medical office. In May 2013, Antell began cooperating with the 
FBI during its investigation of BLS. He recorded a conversation in which Savino agreed 
to a different blood referral arrangement to replace the BLS deal.  
 A federal grand jury in Newark, New Jersey indicted Savino on ten counts.2 
Savino moved to dismiss the indictment, but the District Court denied the motion. After 
                                                 
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence.” 
United States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 132 (3d Cir. 2012). When reviewing a motion to 
dismiss an indictment, we review the District Court’s legal conclusions de novo and its 
factual findings for clear error. E.g., United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 594 (3d Cir. 
2012). We review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse 
of discretion. E.g., United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
2 The counts include: conspiracy to violate the federal Anti-Kickback statute, 
Travel Act, and to defraud patients of honest services (count one); illegal remuneration in 
violation of the federal Anti-Kickback statute (counts two through four); use of the mail 
and facilities in interstate commerce and interstate travel to promote, carry on and 
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an eight-day trial, the jury found Savino guilty on all ten counts. And the Court denied 
Savino’s Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal.  
 The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) first calculated Savino’s base offense 
level at 8, with the gross receipts of the benefit conferred on BLS resulting in a 12-level 
increase under § 2B4.1(b)(1) and § 2B1.1(b)(1)(G) of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines, for a total base offense level of 20. The PSR applied a 2-level increase for 
abuse of a position of trust under Guidelines § 3B1.3, bringing his total offense level to 
22. The applicable Guidelines range was 41 to 51 months. Savino objected to the 12-level 
increase in his sentencing memorandum, but the District Court disagreed. The Court also 
rejected Savino’s request for a downward departure under § 5H1.6 based on family ties 




 We begin with Savino’s contention the Government failed to produce sufficient 
evidence showing he knowingly accepted bribes from BLS, which is required for each 
crime charged in the indictment. Savino argues the evidence shows he believed the cash 
payments were rent because: he received them monthly; BLS used the office for business 
separate from his own; and Savino consistently called the payments rent. He also notes 
                                                 
facilitate commercial bribery (counts five through seven); and scheme to defraud patients 
of honest services (counts eight through ten). 
4 
 
“[t]here were no witnesses that the doctor referred patients to BLS after examinations.” 
Savino Br. 39.  
 Savino is correct that each of the charged crimes required the Government to 
prove he knew the payments were bribes and took them with the intent to refer patients to 
BLS.3 But Savino overlooks the evidence presented at trial from which a rational jury 
could find “the essential elements of the [charged] crime[s] beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 425 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) 
(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).  
                                                 
3 To sustain a conviction for conspiracy, the Government must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt: “(1) the existence of an agreement to achieve an unlawful objective; 
(2) the defendant’s knowing and voluntary participation in the conspiracy; and (3) the 
commission of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v. Rigas, 605 
F.3d 194, 206 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Harmas, 974 F.2d 1262, 1267 
(11th Cir. 1992)).  
The Anti-Kickback statute counts require proof that Savino: (1) “knowingly and 
willfully”; (2) “solicit[ed] or receive[d ] any remuneration”; (3) “in return for referring 
any individual to a person for the furnishing . . . of any item or service for which payment 
may be made in whole or in part under the Federal health care program.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1320a-7b(b)(1)(A). The Travel Act prohibits the use of the mail system or other 
facilities in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in “any unlawful activity.” 
18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3). Here, the predicate offense was bribery under New Jersey’s 
commercial bribery statute, which makes it a crime to “accept[ ] or agree[ ] to accept any 
benefit as consideration for knowingly violating or agreeing to violate a duty of fidelity to 
which [a person] is subject as . . . [a] . . . physician.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:21-10.  
Finally, the Honest Services fraud counts require proof that Savino “devised or 
intend[ed] to devise” a scheme to defraud patients of honest services “by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises” through a wire in interstate 




The Government presented ample circumstantial evidence that Savino intended to 
accept bribes from BLS. Cf. United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 235 n.9 (3d Cir. 
2007) (explaining that “circumstantial evidence is routinely offered to satisfy the intent 
element in criminal cases”). Savino allowed BLS to operate a laboratory in his office 
space without a written agreement in return for cash payments. The lab had no public 
entrance—patients could access the area where blood was drawn only through Savino’s 
office. In the conversation Antell recorded, Savino haggled over the payment scheme 
with a new potential lab, explaining he had “good volume” and could send them certain 
urine testing “that pays tremendously well.” Supp. App. 1069, 1072. He accepted a cash 
payment of $1,500 ostensibly from the new lab and offered to split monthly cash 
payments with Antell if he got the company to do urine testing. These facts more than 
suffice to sustain a jury verdict, which “must be upheld as long as it does not ‘fall below 
the threshold of bare rationality.’” Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 431 (quoting 
Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 656 (2012) (per curiam)).  
B 
 Savino also claims the District Court erred in not dismissing the Travel Act counts 
because violations of the New Jersey commercial bribery statute cannot serve as 
predicate acts for his conduct in New York. Relatedly, he contends the New Jersey 
bribery statute is void for vagueness because it does not provide fair warning that a New 
York physician could be criminally liable under that act. Finally, he argues the Court 
should have dismissed the Travel Act and Honest Services counts because “[t]here was 
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no established fiduciary relationship between the doctors and his patients made clear by 
the applicable statutes or case law.” Savino Br. 46.  
 These arguments are unpersuasive. First, we have held that out-of-state conduct 
under the New Jersey commercial bribery statute can serve as a predicate offense under 
the Travel Act. See United States v. Lee, 359 F.3d 194, 205–07 (3d Cir. 2004). In Lee, we 
explained that “[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing 
detrimental effects within it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm as if [the 
defendant] had been present [in the state] at the effect.” Id. (alterations in original) 
(quoting Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911)). As the District Court noted, the 
indictment alleged BLS was based in New Jersey; the blood was shipped to and tested 
there; and the payments from Antell came from New Jersey. So we agree with the 
District Court that New Jersey had a legitimate and substantial interest in “imposing 
criminal liability for individuals who receive bribes from New Jersey-based corporations 
which constitute . . . bribery under the New Jersey [c]ommercial [b]ribery [s]tatute.” App. 
112.  
 Savino’s argument that the New Jersey commercial bribery statute is void for 
vagueness is flawed for similar reasons. A statute is void for vagueness if it “fails to give 
ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or [is] so standardless that it invites 
arbitrary enforcement.” Baptiste v. Att’y Gen., 841 F.3d 601, 615 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting 
Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015)). Savino’s dealings with New 
Jersey-based BLS, as detailed in the indictment, gave him fair notice under the New 
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Jersey bribery statute. See Lee, 359 F.3d at 206. And the statute specifies that Savino had 
fiduciary duties as a doctor: it criminalizes the acceptance of “any benefit as 
consideration for knowingly violating or agreeing to violate a duty of fidelity to which he 
is subject as . . . [a] physician.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:21-10. So Savino’s contention that 
the District Court should have dismissed the Travel Act and Honest Services counts 
because of a lack of an “established fiduciary relationship between the doctors and his 
patients” is likewise incorrect. See Savino Br. 46. 
For these reasons, the District Court did not err in denying Savino’s motion to 
dismiss the Travel Act and Honest Services counts.  
C 
 Finally, Savino mounts several challenges to his 48-month sentence. None is 
persuasive. 
 First, he contends the Court should have increased his base offense by 10 levels 
instead of 12 under Guidelines § 2B1.1(b)(1)(G). He argues the Court’s benefit 
determination erroneously relied on “attorneys’ theories and estimates, rather than actual 
evidence” about direct costs, which should be subtracted from the total benefit estimate. 
Savino Br. 52. The record suggests otherwise. The District Court’s finding that the 
Government supplied “more than sufficient evidence to support” a benefit exceeding 
$250,000 was based, in large part, on expert testimony from an FBI forensic accountant 
and an extensive letter brief reinforcing its calculations. App. 233.  
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Next, Savino claims the District Court procedurally erred by failing to address 
disparities between his sentence and those of other doctors previously sentenced for 
involvement in the same BLS scheme. At sentencing, the Court distinguished Savino 
from those defendants (who had lower Guidelines ranges and received downward 
departures for cooperation) and explicitly compared Savino to Dr. Bernard Greenspan 
(who received leniency because of his age). So the Court gave meaningful consideration 
to sentencing disparities in its analysis of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. See United 
States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 215–16 (3d Cir. 2010). 
Finally, Savino contends his 48-month sentence is substantively unreasonable 
because the Court failed to account for his positive traits, including his service to his 
community as a physician. But the record again contradicts this claim. The Court 
considered Savino’s arguments for mitigation, including the letters and videos from 
patients supporting him and his filial obligation to his elderly mother. The Court also 
thoroughly explained its analysis of the § 3553(a) factors. Savino’s within-Guidelines 
sentence is not unreasonable. See United States v. Tomko, 592 F.3d 558, 567–68 (3d Cir. 
2009) (en banc). 
* * * 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment and sentence. 
